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BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his conviction for equity skimming, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-522 (1999) (in Addendum A). This 
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue 1. Defendant was charged and bound over for committing equity 
skimming "on or between July 19, 2002 and October 15, 2002," the parties both 
addressed relevant evidence at trial spanning July 19 through July 30, but the 
elements jury instruction stated that the offense occurred "on or around July 19[.]" 
A. Did the district court have jurisdiction over the offense? 
B. Did defense counsel render ineffective assistance by failing to demand 
an additional preliminary hearing involving the evidence of equity skimming 
involving only the July 19 transaction? 
Standards of Review 
A. "The determination of whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is 
a question of law, which [this Court] review[s] for correctness[.]" Beaver v. 
Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81, \ 8, 31 P.3d 1147. 
B. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised for the first time on 
appeal are reviewed as a matter of law. State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32, \ 20, 984 
P.2d 376. 
Issue 2, Did the prosecutor's closing remarks constitute plain error where, 
without objection by defendant, the remarks accurately restated the testimony of 
three witnesses from the State's point of view? 
Standard of Review—This unpreserved claim of prosecutorial misconduct 
is reviewed for plain error. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). To 
establish plain error, defendant must establish the existence of an error that 
should have been obvious to the trial court and that resulted in prejudice to 
defendant. Id. 
Issue 3. Did defense counsel render ineffective assistance in any of the 
eight ways identified by defendant, where defendant fails to establish that counsel 
performed below a reasonable objective standard or could not have acted pursuant 
to objectively reasonable trial strategy? 
2 
Standard of Review Ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised for the 
first time on appeal are reviewed as a matter of law. See State v. Litherland, 2000 
UT 76, U 2, 12 P.3d 92; see also Maestas, 1999 UT 32, \ 20. Because defendant 
raised one of his ineffective assistance claims below, that claim is reviewed on 
appeal as a mixed question of law and fact. See State v. Mecham, 2000 UT App 
247,^jl9,9P.3d777. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On Jan 15, 2003, defendant was charged by information with one count of 
equity skimming, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-522 
(1999) (R. 7). Add. A. On defendant's motion, four counts of arranging or 
brokering motor vehicles without a license, class A misdemeanors, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-3-201 (1999), were combined with the felony case (R. 
132:3-4). 
Defendant waived any right to a preliminary hearing on the misdemeanors 
but did request a preliminary hearing on the equity skimming charge (R. 36; R. 
132:3). Defendant was bound over on the information as charged with no 
modification or amendment (R. 36; R. 132:45) (bindover ruling in Addendum A). 
The information charged defendant with committing equity skimming "on or 
between July 19, 2002 and October 15, 2002" (R. 7) (in Addendum A). No 
charges were dismissed (R. 132). 
3 
After a two-day trial, the jury found defendant guilty on all charges (R. 136-
37, 140, 142, 144, 146, 148). Defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict or in the alternative for a new trial (R. 184-88). At sentencing the court 
denied defendant's motions and sentenced defendant to a prison term of zero to 
five years for the felony, with six-month terms on the misdemeanors to run 
concurrently (R. 202-04, 247-49). Defendant timely appealed, sought a stay 
pending appeal, then obtained new counsel (R. 205-06, 207-08, 226-27, 250-52). 
Defendant's new counsel applied for a certificate of probable cause under 
Rule 27, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, to release defendant pending the 
outcome of the appeal (R. 232-45). At the motion hearing, the court specifically 
denied the petition on the two grounds defendant raised, but raised sua sponte an 
issue regarding the date of the offense stated injury instruction 14 and granted the 
motion based on that issue (R. 255-56, 261-63; R. 291:17, 18-19; referring to 
instruction no. 14atR. 167). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
Defendant, a salesperson for Mountain States Motors ["MSM"] in Vernal, 
Utah, was not licensed to sell cars (R. 268:209). He knew he needed a license, 
but he "didn't think it was that big of a deal," to get the license before he started 
selling cars (R. 268:210). Defendant sold a truck to Chade Abplanalp, a 1996 
1 Except as otherwise noted, this brief recites the facts in the light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, H 2,12 P.3d 92. 
4 
Monte Carlo to Luke and Jamie Fausett, and at least three other cars for MSM, all 
for a commission, all without a license (R. 268:152, 224, 231-232). 
The July 19 Events 
On July 19th, 2002, nineteen-year-old Chade Abplanalp visited MSM and 
talked to defendant about buying a new vehicle (R. 267:57-58, 261). He settled 
on a 1999 Chevy S-10 truck ["S-10"] and discussed with defendant prices and a 
trade in of Abplanalp's 1996 Chevy Monte Carlo ["Monte Carlo"] (R. 267:58). 
As they discussed the purchase, Abplanalp told defendant that he still owed 
Mountain America Credit Union ["Mountain America"] $3,400 to $3,600 on the 
Monte Carlo (R. 267:59, 73, 78; R. 268:258). Defendant said there would be "no 
problem" with the amount owed to Mountain America (R. 267:59-60). MSM 
credited Abplanalp $5,000 towards purchase of the truck for having traded in the 
Monte Carlo (R. 267:72; R. 268:247). 
Defendant produced a Motor Vehicle Sale Contract which contained a line 
for "balance owed on trade in," and that line said "0" (R. 267:63; R. 268:265; 
pi's exh 3). Abplanalp testified that he doesn't know "car sales laws" or much 
about "how contracts work," but he did know that there was a balance owed to 
Mountain America, so he asked defendant what the zeros on that line meant (R. 
267:64, 77; R. 268:265). Defendant told Abplanalp that the zeros meant that 
MSM would be responsible for the payoff of the Monte Carlo (R. 267:64; R. 
268:265, 267). 
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At defendant's request, Abplanalp signed a pay off authorization form that 
required his Mountain America account number and the Monte Carlo 
identification information (R. 267:62, 75; R. 268:263, 266). Abplanalp was 
familiar with the pay off authorization form and was able to describe the size 
(8.5" x 3") and color of the document before seeing it in court (R. 132: 19; pi's 
exh 6). That document, titled, "Authorization for Payoff," allows the dealer to 
pay the balance owing on a vehicle and obtain the title (R. 267:76; R. 268:266). 
Defendant testified that he never gave Abplanalp that form because it was not 
needed, as Abplanalp remained responsible to pay off the Monte Carlo (R. 
268:235). 
The July 23 Events 
Abplanalp closed the deal on the truck with defendant on July 23, 2002, by 
delivering a check for $10,000 to defendant, turning the Monte Carlo over to 
MSM, and taking possession of the truck (R. 268:218-19). Although defendant 
testified that he knew that Abplanalp owed a balance on the Monte Carlo, 
defendant did not attempt to verify that the balance had been paid before closing 
the deal and taking the Monte Carlo (R. 268:234, 236, 237, 238). 
The July 30 Events 
Seven days later, on July 30th, 2002, defendant sold the Monte Carlo to 
Luke and Jamie Fausett, without a license to sell cars, and without verifying that 
MSM had title to the Monte Carlo or that the Monte Carlo had ever been paid off 
6 
(R. 268:123, 239, 240; pi's exh 7). MSM never obtained title to the Monte Carlo, 
requiring that it rescind the sale between defendant and the Fausetts and repossess 
the vehicle (R. 268:126, 127, 134, 136, 137, 140). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Contrary to defendant's claim, the district court bound defendant over on 
the charge in the information, giving the district court jurisdiction to try defendant 
on that charge. Further, defendant was tried on the exact charge that was bound 
over, namely, equity skimming committed "on or between July 19, 2002 and 
October 15, 2002." Defendant's affirmative approval of the jury instructions 
below amounts to invited error and prevents any appellate review of the jury 
instruction for manifest error. Even undertaking such review, defendant's 
argument fails as he is unable to establish manifest injustice. Inclusion in the 
elements instruction of the phrase "on or about July 19" does not convert 
defendant's conviction into a conviction for only the transaction occurring on that 
date where the date is not an element of the charge, the evidence, the arguments, 
and the remaining instructions made it clear that the charge involved the conduct 
spanning the period from July 19 through July 30, and the eleven-day range of 
relevant dates between July 19 and the relevant dates contained in the information 
is reasonably seen as "on or about" July 19. Because defendant was tried and 
convicted as charged and bound over, both his jurisdictional claim and his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim necessarily fail. 
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Defendant's prosecutorial misconduct claim fails because defendant did not 
preserve the claim below, and he does not establish plain error on appeal. The 
prosecutor's challenged comments—representations in closing argument of the 
testimony of three witnesses—properly presented the testimony and the reasonable 
inferences therefrom as viewed by the State. 
Defendant fails to establish deficient performance for any of his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims, and he inadequately pleads the prejudice prong for 
his claims. Consequently, this Court need not address any of defendant's 
ineffective assistance claims. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT INVITED THE ERROR HE CLAIMS AROSE 
FROM AN ERRONEOUS JURY INSTRUCTION; 
ALTERNATIVELY, HE FAILS TO ESTABLISH MANIFEST 
INJUSTICE REGARDING THE JURY INSTRUCTION; 
FINALLY, THE INSTRUCTION PERMITTED HIS 
CONVICTION AS CHARGED 
Defendant contends that reversal is required because he was convicted of a 
different transaction than the one on which the magistrate bound the case over. Br. 
of Aplt. at 1, 21-32. He argues that at the preliminary hearing, the prosecution 
produced evidence relating to transactions on July 19 and 23 in order to support 
the State's case that the equity skimming occurred on July 30, when defendant sold 
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the Monte Carlo to the Fausetts. Id. at 21. He claims that the State argued the 
same theory at trial. Id. at 22. 
However, he points to jury instruction number 14 and claims that the 
language of the instruction necessarily dictates that he was tried and convicted for 
equity skimming based solely on the transaction with Chade Abplanalp which 
occurred on July 19. Id. at 25. Because this possibility had never been the focus 
of the case, defendant contends that he was tried and convicted of a charge for 
which he never received a preliminary hearing, thereby depriving the district court 
of jurisdiction over his case. Br. of Aplt. at 22, 24-25, 29. 
A. Preservation And Review. 
Because jurisdiction may be raised at any time, defendant's jurisdictional 
argument is properly before this Court, but the claim lacks any merit.2 
Defendant's challenge to the jury instruction itself, however, is raised for the first 
time on appeal after defendant had affirmative approved the jury instruction below. 
Hence, if review is had, it will be for manifest error. See State v. Anderson, 929 
P.2d 1107, 1108-09 (Utah 1996). Where defendant also claims ineffective 
assistance of counsel for failing to direct the district court to the jury instruction 
and seek a correction, the claim is reviewed on appeal as a matter of law. See 
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 2, 12 P.3d 92. 
2 The district court judge sua sponte noted in passing that there might be 
jurisdictional issues involving the jury instruction, but he did not elaborate (R. 274: 
16). Neither was he faced with the argument at that time. 
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B. Proceedings Below, 
Defendant was charged with committing equity skimming "on or between 
July 19, 2002 and October 15, 2002" (R. 7). Add. A. At the preliminary hearing, 
the State adduced evidence relating to the three principal dates included within the 
range stated in the information: July 19, 23, and 30, 2002 (R. 267: 57-58; R. 268: 
123, 218-19, 239). Defendant was thereafter bound over as charged for equity 
skimming (R. 132:45). The court did not amend the information, and defendant 
requested no bill of particulars regarding the dates included in the information (see 
R. 132). 
The evidence adduced at trial focused on the acquisition and sale of the 
Monte Carlo and involved the same three principal dates: July 19, 23, and 30, 
2002 (R. 132: 44-45; R. 267:passim; R. 268: passim; pi's exh. 7). See Statement 
of Facts, supra. The proof established that: (1) on July 19, during the course of 
entering a contract for the sale to Chade Abplanalp of a Chevy S-10 truck, 
defendant represented to Abplanalp that MSM would pay off the balance owed by 
Abplanalp on the Monte Carlo he was trading in as part of the deal (R. 267: 57-58, 
60, 73, 78: R. 268: 258); (2) on July 23, defendant took possession of the Monte 
Carlo as a trade-in and gave Abplanalp possession of the S-10 after Abplanalp 
tendered the $10,000 check from Mountain America; and 3) on July 30, defendant 
sold the Monte Carlo to Luke and Jamie Fausett, knowing that the Monte Carlo 
was subject to an existing security interest but not checking to see if it had been 
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paid off (R. 268: 123, 239, 240; pi's. exh. 7). All three events are necessary and 
important to establishing the foundation, intent, and commission of equity 
skimming. That is why the information included a range of dates and the State's 
case included evidence regarding all three dates. 
C. No Jurisdictional Issue. 
Defendant's claim that the district court lacked jurisdiction over his trial and 
conviction of a charge for which he had no preliminary hearing is without merit.3 
The jury instruction does not give rise to a jurisdictional problem because 
defendant was properly bound over on the range of dates noted in the information, 
including July 19, after having a full preliminary hearing, and the instruction did 
not limit the jury's consideration of the evidence. See subsection F, infra. 
The law is clear that the district court has jurisdiction to try defendant on the 
charge bound over. "By the bindover order, the magistrate requires the defendant 
'to answer [the information] in the district court.' The information is then 
transferred to the district court, permitting that court to take original jurisdiction of 
the matter." State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464, 465-466 (Utah 1991) (quoting Utah 
R. Crim. P. 7(8)(b)). Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that 
the district court obtains jurisdiction to try a defendant on charges contained in an 
3 Defendant does not claim that jury instruction 14 requires reversal of his 
conviction independently of his jurisdictional argument. Neither does he challenge 
the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the alleged conviction for equity skimming 
on July 19. 
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information through a bindover order. Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h)(1). Because 
defendant was bound over on the charge in the information, the district court had 
jurisdiction to try him on that charge. 
D. Invited Error, 
Defendant's argument is premised on jury instruction 14, which required the 
jury to convict defendant upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt: 
1. That Dustin Marshall; 
2. On or about July 19, 2002 
3. Did as a dealer or broker; 
4. Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly 
a. Transferred or arranged the transfer of a vehicle for consideration 
5. When he knew or should have known the vehicle was subject to a 
security interest; 
6. Without first obtaining written authorization of the holder of the security 
interest. 
(R. 167) (in Addendum B). 
Defendant challenged the instruction below in his post-trial motion, arguing 
that there was no evidence upon which the jury could have found equity skimming 
based solely on the July 19 transaction (R. 185). At sentencing, the trial judge 
heard argument, then denied the motion (R. 274: 13-17) (in Addendum B). The 
judge noted that prior to instructing the jury, both parties had actively represented 
to the court in chambers that the instructions were acceptable (R. 274:12-13). 
"While a party who fails to object to or give an instruction may have an 
instruction assigned as error under the manifest injustice exception, Utah R. Crim. 
P. 19(e), 'a party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when that 
12 
party led the trial court into committing the error.'" State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 
•16, \ 9, 86 P.3d 742 (quoting State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996) 
(additional quotations omitted)). Consequently, "a jury instruction may not be 
assigned as error even if such instruction constitutes manifest injustice 'if counsel, 
either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the court that he or she had 
no objection to the jury instruction.'" Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16 at ^ 9 (quoting 
State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, If 54, 70 P.3d 111). Where a defendant confirms 
that the defense had no objection to the jury instructions given by the trial court, he 
has invited error and may not obtain appellate review of the instruction for 
manifest injustice. See Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, f^ 55.4 
K Waiver 
A defendant's failure to raise an issue before the trial court, even a 
constitutional one, waives appellate review of the issue. See State v. Holgate, 2000 
UT 74, f 11, 10 P.3d 346; State v. Marvin, 964 P.2d 313, 318 (Utah 1998). 
Defendant contends that he "preserved the issue to some extent" because he 
touched on it in his motion for a new trial or for judgment notwithstanding the 
4 Manifest injustice is synonymous with the "plain error" standard provided in Utah 
Rule of Evidence 103(d). See State v. Powell, 872 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Utah 1994). 
When reviewing a claim of manifest injustice, appellate courts generally use the same 
standard that is applied to determine whether plain error exists under rule 103(d) of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence. See State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121-22 (Utah 1989). 
That standard is two-pronged. "First, the error must be 'obvious.1 Second, the error 
must be of sufficient magnitude that it affects the substantial rights of a party." 
Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1109. 
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verdict, and, he implies, because the trial judge ruled on the merits of the issue, at 
least to "some extent." Br. of Aplt. at 27-28. 
Below, defendant argued to the district court that the evidence at trial did not 
support his conviction for equity skimming on July 19 (R. 185). On appeal, 
defendant assumes, without argument or justification, that the jury instruction 
necessarily resulted in a conviction for the July 19 transaction alone. Br. of Aplt. 
at 24-25. He argues instead that the due process provisions of the federal and state 
constitutions protect his right to a fair and impartial trial, and that the provisions 
were violated by the absence of a preliminary hearing on the offense of which he 
was convicted. Id. at 23-24. Because defendant has failed to preserve the claim 
he makes on appeal, he has waived his claim unless he can establish that manifest 
error occurred with respect to the jury instruction. See Anderson, 929 P.2d 
1108-09. However, as defendant invited the error, he is not entitled to manifest 
error review. See Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16 at f^ 
F. Manifest Error. 
Even if the claim is reviewed for manifest error, it fails. Defendant argues 
that use of the language "on or about July 19" injury instruction 14 necessarily led 
the jury to convict him of equity skimming based only on the transaction that 
occurred on that date. Br. of App. at 22, 24-25. As there was no evidence in the 
preliminary hearing or at trial that the offense was complete upon the close of the 
14 
transaction on July 19, defendant claims he was boundover, tried, and convicted on 
a claim for which he did not receive a prelim hearing. Br. of Aplt. at 23-24. 
Defendant has been charged with only one instance of equity skimming, but 
the parties and the court agree that each of the three transactions on separate days 
in July are relevant to establishing the requisite elements of the charge. Even on 
appeal, defendant does not contend that a conviction on the charged offense can be 
established by less than all the evidence relating to all three dates. 
The information clearly sets forth a range of dates during which the equity 
skimming occurred (R. 7). The crime charged in the information and the evidence 
presented at trial focused on the same period of time and the same conduct. The 
parties' opening and closing remarks, as well as their examination of the witnesses 
at trial, focused on events which occurred on July 19, 23, and 30. Abplanalp's 
testimony involved the transactions on July 19 and 23 (R. 267:57-80; R. 268:258-
69). Luke and Jamie Fausett's testimony focused on the July 30 sale and included 
repossession of the Monte Carlo from the Fausetts on August 22 and 
reimbursement in the form of a different Monte Carlo thereafter (R. 268: 122-38). 
Shelly Sorenson testified about July 19, July 23, and the "second week of August" 
(R. 267:93-114; R. 268:120-21). Defendant testified primarily about July 19, July 
23, July 30, "the 7th or 8th of August," and "around the 12th" of August (R. 
268:208-48). Thus the State's evidence did not focus on a single date or event to 
the exclusion of others (R. 132:44). Rather the State's evidence presented a 
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complete picture of events relating to equity skimming and the Monte Carlo 
beginning on July 19 and ending with the transfer of the car to the Fausetts on July 
30 (R. 267; 268). Even the parties' arguments focused on all three dates, not a 
single date or a single transaction as establishing the charge of equity skimming. 
At no time during trial was it suggested that the jury need only consider the 
evidence of the July 19 transaction or that all of the requisite elements for equity 
skimming could be found in the events of that single day. There is nothing in the 
trial itself that suggests that the jury need not consider more than July 19. The 
parties' presentation of witnesses and evidence left no doubt that they did not 
contest the existence of the transactions involved, simply the details of what 
occurred within the context of each transaction. Given the evidence, the parties' 
arguments, and the information, it is clear that, despite the parties' inability to 
agree specifically on what happened on each date, the parties have, throughout the 
entirety of the proceedings, viewed the offense as having been violated only upon 
completion of the July 30 transaction. 
Additionally, the jury's consideration of events beyond but near July 19 is 
entirely appropriate and justified in this case. The wording of the jury instruction 
permits consideration of conduct "[o]n or about July 19, 2002" (R. 167). The 
charged offense clearly began on July 19 and continued with various transactions, 
ultimately culminating on July 30-a span of eleven days. The fact that the jury 
took only twenty minutes to deliberate demonstrates that they were not confused or 
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divided as to the instruction or the offense charged. Under the well-delineated 
circumstances of this case, and the uniform view of all involved as to the relevant 
transactions, the jury is reasonably likely to have seen the eleven-day span 
beginning on the date provided in the instruction as being "on or about" July 19. 
Because the evidence, the parties' arguments, the language in the 
information, and the instruction's use of the phrase "on or about" make it 
extremely unlikely that the jury limited either its consideration of the evidence or 
the basis of its conviction to the single date of July 19, defendant fails to establish 
the requisite manifest error. As defendant cannot establish that the jury convicted 
him based only on the date of July 19, he cannot establish his claimed 
jurisdictional error nor his asserted ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
Consequently, incorporation into the instruction of a single date instead of 
the range of three dates does not amount to an "obvious" error under the facts of 
this case, if it amounts to error at all. Further, the use of the date in the jury 
instruction is not likely to have affected defendant's substantial rights where the 
date is not an element of the offense (see Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-522), and where 
the information, the evidence, and the parties have uniformly presented the offense 
as spanning all three dates. Hence, defendant has failed to establish the requisite 
manifest error to prevail on his claim. See Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1109. 
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Moreover, as the jury instruction did not serve to change the jury's focus 
from the charged offense to a single date, there is no jurisdictional defect in 
defendant's conviction, and his first claim fails in its entirety. 
POINT II 
THE PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING REMARKS PROPERLY 
REFLECTED THE EVIDENCE AND ITS REASONABLE 
INFERENCES FROM THE STATE'S VIEWPOINT AND, 
HENCE, DID NOT CONSTITUTE PLAIN ERROR 
Defendant contends that the prosecutor demonstrated misconduct in his 
closing argument when he referred to the testimony of Shelly Sorenson, Chade 
Abplanalp, and defendant. Br. of Aplt at 32-35. He claims that the prosecutor's 
summary of this testimony tainted the fairness of the proceedings and warrants 
reversal of his conviction. Id. 
Although defendant raises this claim as one of prosecutorial misconduct, 
he failed to object to the remarks below. Consequently, he must demonstrate 
plain error. To do so, defendant must show that (1) an error occurred, (2) the 
error should have been obvious to the trial court, and (3) the error was prejudicial 
to defendant. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). Where 
the plain error claim involves prosecutorial misconduct, defendant must show 
"that the prosecutor's [conduct] was so obviously improper that the trial court 
had an opportunity to address the error." State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, f 62, 55 
P.3d 573. Defendant has not made that showing here. 
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A. No Obvious Error Exists Where the Comments Reflected the 
State's Point of View of the Evidence. 
Defendant challenges the prosecutor's remarks about witness testimony. 
Both parties are permitted "considerable latitude" in their closing remarks to 
argue the evidence and its reasonable inferences from their own perspective. See 
State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989). The prosecutor's challenged 
remarks do nothing more than that. Consequently, none of the remarks amounts 
to error, let alone obvious error.5 
1. Shelly Sorenson. Defendant claims the prosecutor erroneously argued 
that Shelly Sorenson, a loan processor with Mountain America, testified she pays 
no attention to the part of the contract which purports to show who is supposed to 
pay off the trade-in vehicle: 
[THE PROSECUTOR:] Okay. How do you know or is there 
a way to know from a contract what the intent of the dealer is as to 
what the payoff for the new vehicle is on the trade in? 
A. Most of the time it's on the contract if they're paying off 
something, or how much they're giving them for cash on the trade 
in. Is that what you mean? 
Q. I think so. 
A. Okay. 
5 Moreover, the jury was properly instructed that they were the fact finders, they 
were to determine what evidence was relevant, and they were to give witness 
testimony the weight which they decided it deserved (R. 154, 172-73, 176-77). 
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Q. Okay. So if a contract comes in that doesn't discuss a 
payoff at all, then you have no way of knowing who had a duty to 
pay that one way or another; is that correct? 
A. We, most of the time, don't pay attention to a lot of that, 
because it just depends on how they work it out with the dealer. 
We, most of the time, don't pay attention to a lot of that, 
because it just depends on how they work it out with the dealer (R. 
267:106). 
[L]ike I said, we usually don't worry about that part of it, 
because it's all part of the deal that they're worked out with the 
dealer[.]" 
(R. 267:106) (prosecutor's closing in "Add. C). 
In his initial closing remarks, the prosecutor stated: 
Let me just add here something that I don't have on this 
particular diagram relating to Shelly Sorenson's comments. When 
questioned about the contract, the sales contract which is your State's 
Exhibit No. 3, do you remember what she said about the trade in? 
She said, "We don't pay any attention to that part of the contract, 
because different car dealers do it differently and they negotiate it 
differently." 
So even though the defendant's going to come up here 
through his attorney and argue, "This is what the contract said, that 
Chade owed that[.]" . . . There was a zero here, you know. It didn't 
matter to the banker. As a matter of fact, the banker said, "You're 
allowed $10,000 and we assumed that's all it was." As a matter of 
, fact, the person who secured the loan, Shelly Sorenson, said, "I 
assumed that Mountain States would be paying off the car." 
(R. 268: 274-75) (emphasis added). Add. C. In rebuttal, the prosecutor 
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continued: 
Let me tell you some other reasons I think you need to 
believe Chade's story about this. Shelly Sorenson, she deals with 
these contracts. She testified quite a bit. You know how much 
attention she paid to line 11 and the payoff amount on this contract 
of sale, Exhibit No. 3. Remember what she said? Zero. 
It didn't matter, because the dealership makes other 
representations. Mr. Sprouse testified that they were going to give 
him a $5,000 trade in on a car that was only worth $3,300 to him. 
He said, "Well, that's just how you make the deal." 
In other words, he's willing to represent something 
completely different than what's reality to make the deal, and that's 
why Shelly Sorenson says, "We don't pay any attention to that 
line," because the defendant represented that he was — that 
Mountain States was going to pay off the loan to Mountain 
America Credit Union. 
(R. 268: 287) (emphasis added). Add. C. 
Defendant claims that Sorenson was "never asked" about that part of the 
contract and that she said the credit union does not normally worry about 
contracts that do not specify who will make payoffs because "'it's all part of the 
deal that they've worked out with the dealer.'" Br. of Aplt. at 33 (quoting R. 
267: 106). In fact, Sorenson's testimony demonstrates that she was asked by the 
prosecutor about the pay-off amount line on such contracts, that she answered 
those questions, and that she usually did not worry about what that line said 
generally (R. 267:106). 
21 
Defendant claims the prosecutor's remarks improperly stress that 
Sorenson ignores that line in the contract because it is usually inaccurate or that 
she ignored it in this case because defendant said he would pay off the balance. 
Id at 33. However, this misinterprets the prosecutor's statements. Sorenson's 
testimony did not blame her lack of attention to the line on any inaccuracy, but 
on Sorenson's knowledge of the different methods of handling trade-ins that 
were used among dealerships and sellers (R. 267: 106). Defendant made no 
representation to Sorenson that he would pay off the balance, as defendant 
suggests the prosecutor argued. Br. of Aplt. at 33. Rather, the prosecutor meant 
that Sorenson knew that different terms are applied by different sellers and 
dealerships which tended to change the relevance of that information in the 
contract (R. 268:287). Moreover, regardless of the argument, the jury was 
properly instructed that they were the fact finders, they were to determine what 
evidence was relevant, and they were to give witness testimony that weight 
which they decided it deserved (R. 154, 172, 173, 177). Accordingly, 
defendant's claim misrepresents both the arguments and the testimony and fails 
to establish plain error. 
2. Defendant Marshall's financing representations. In the initial 
closing remarks, the prosecutor commented: 
Also, the defendant knew there was a lien on the Monte 
Carlo when he sold it to the Fausetts, because of all of these other 
inferences. Another inference that you might consider is when he 
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said, "It would be better if you can finance through Mountain 
States. " If he finances the whole thing through Mountain States 
you can almost infer that the defendant might have been attempting 
to hide the transaction of exactly what was going on, if it had been 
totally financed through Mountain States. 
Now, these are potential inferences, but the reality is did he 
know or should have known? That's the real issue, and he 
admitted that he knew there was a lien on the — there was a lien on 
that particular car to begin with, and he did absolutely nothing 
before he was involved in the transaction to pass it through 
somebody else to verify if the lien was clear. 
(R. 268: 277) (emphasis added). Add. C. 
Defendant challenges the highlighted representation of defendant's 
statement to Abplanalp, saying that it improperly colors the testimony because it 
suggests that defendant was actively attempting to persuade Abplanalp to accept 
in-house financing instead of merely suggesting the option. Br. of Aplt. at 33-34. 
While the prosecutor did not exactly quote the testimony, the statement properly 
presents the testimonial evidence from the State's point of view. Abplanalp 
testified that when he "talked to [defendant] in person," that defendant "offered 
me an in-house financing to pay off the Monte Carlo and I told him no" (R. 
267:66). Defendant testified that, "I asked Mr. Abplanalp, as I ask all of our 
customers, if they wished to utilize our [MSM's] help in securing financing for 
their purchase" (R. 268:214). 
The prosecutor's argument properly communicated the fact that defendant 
had offered Abplanalp financing through MSM, not once but twice, leaving to 
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the jury's collective memory the circumstances surrounding the offer. Defendant 
may view the statement as suggesting persuasion, but given the parties' leeway 
in closing to present the evidence from their own points of view, the prosecutor 
was within his right to make the argument because it was a reasonable inference 
from the testimony. See State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, f^ 51, 55 P.3d 1131. 
Further, the jury was also able to factor into their deliberations defendant's claim 
that he makes the same offer to everyone. Where the prosecutor was careful to 
correctly label the discussion as involving "potential inferences," testimony from 
Abplanalp and defendant supported the basic factual premise that in-house 
financing was offered, and a reasonable juror could, but need not, reach the same 
inference as the prosecutor, the challenged statement does not amount to 
prosecutorial misconduct, let alone reach the level of obvious and prejudicial 
misconduct required under the plain error doctrine. 
3. Defendant's reliance on Abplanalp regarding payoff of the Monte 
Carlo. The prosecutor closed his rebuttal remarks with the following argument: 
Let me just say one other thing. As you consider which 
testimony you believe and which of Chade or Mr. Marshall, you 
know, Mr. Marshall sat up here on the witness stand and testified, 
"You know, I just trusted him that he would get the title. I had his 
word. I had his word that he would pay off a $3,300 to $3,600 to 
Mountain America and just give me the title. I had his word." 
So why didn't he rely on his word for the $918.35? He 
entered a contract that had to be cosigned for $918.35, but he'll 
take his word that he's going to pay off the title for $3,300 to 
$3,600. The reality of the fact is and what is really happening is 
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what Mountain States agreed to was not what Mr. Marshall agreed 
to. 
Mr. Marshall represented to Mr. Albplanalp [sic] that he 
was going to pay off Mountain America. That didn't happen, but 
in the interim, the crime here is when Mr. Marshall involved 
himself as a dealer or broker in transferring that vehicle to the 
Fausetts, knowing or should have known that the vehicle had a lien 
on it, and did not first get written authorization to sell the vehicle. 
(R. 268:288-89). Add. C. 
Defendant contends that he did not testify that he was relying on 
Abplanalp's word that he would pay off the Monte Carlo, but instead said that he 
"relied on the signed contract" representing that Abplanalp would do so. Br. of 
Aplt. at 35. Again, both positions are reasonable interpretations of defendant's 
testimony at trial, enabling the prosecutor to argue the evidence from the State's 
point of view. Defendant testified that he believed "Mountain States has the 
right to be able to operate on our customer's word" (R. 268:236). Abplanalp was 
the customer in this case (R. 267:57). Defendant also testified that Abplanalp 
"told me he would pay it off (R. 268:236), and that, "I had no reason to doubt 
the man" (R. 268:238). The prosecutor's statement that the defendant said he 
relied on the victim's word regarding the pay off of the Monte Carlo is a 
reasonable inference from defendant's own testimony. Counsel are entitled to 
argue the reasonable inferences of the evidence. See State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 
288,151, 55 P.3d 1131. 
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The fact that defendant's interpretation of his own testimony differs from 
the prosecutor's interpretation does not render the prosecutor's argument error. 
It was patently clear to the jury that defendant interpreted the written contract 
itself as providing that Abplanalp was responsible for paying off the Monte Carlo 
and getting the title to MSM (R. 268: 233, 235, 240-43). Hence, defendant's 
interpretation of the testimony—that he relied on the contract, not Abplanalp—is 
reasonable from his point of view and was fully before this jury, Br. of Aplt. at 
35. The State presented evidence suggesting that defendant verbally led 
Abplanalp to believe MSM would pay off the Monte Carlo. In keeping with its 
point of view, the prosecutor's view of the testimony was simply a different but 
wholly reasonable interpretation which the prosecutor is entitled to present in 
closing argument. See Dibello, 780 P.2d at 1225. 
Thus defendant has failed to show material error, let alone error that was 
"so obviously improper that the trial court had an opportunity to address the 
error," absent an objection from counsel. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, J^ 62. 
B. Defendant's Ineffective Assistance Argument Fails For 
Lack of Proof of Both Prongs of The Test 
Defendant also claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance 
by "failing to assert and apply this clear law." Br. of Aplt. at 39-40. Where each 
of the challenged closing remarks simply clarified the evidence in a light most 
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favorable to the State, there was no deficient performance in defense counsel's 
failure to object. See subsection IIA, supra. 
Further, defendant presents only a cumulative and inadequate prejudice 
argument. He claims that the result of the challenged statements "was certainly 
prejudicial" without elaboration. This is insufficient to meet his burden of 
showing prejudice as something more than a speculative matter. See Fernandez 
v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1998). This deficiency alone defeats 
defendant's ineffective assistance claim. See State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 
(Utah 1986) ("If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground 
of lack of sufficient prejudice,.. . that course should be followed"). 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO ESTABLISH INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHERE THE 
INCONSISTENCIES TRIAL COUNSEL DID NOT 
ADDRESS WERE NON-EXISTENT, REASONABLE TRIAL 
STRATEGY DICTATED COUNSEL'S CONDUCT, AND 
THE SPECIFIED ACTION WOULD HAVE BEEN FUTILE; 
FURTHER, DEFENDANT FAILS TO ESTABLISH 
PREJUDICE 
Defendant challenges his trial counsel's effectiveness on several 
additional bases, claiming that counsel was ineffective for: 
-seeking joinder of the misdemeanor charges with the felony charges; 
-introducing at trial the "Authorization for Payoff form without 
establishing a foundation for the victim's file to establish whether the form 
was in it; 
27 
-failing to effectively cross-examine Abplanalp about his inconsistent 
testimony; 
-failing to exclude testimony regarding the odometer issue; 
-failing to seek a jury instruction on Abplanalp's statutory responsibility to 
produce title to the Monte Carlo; 
-introducing at trial testimony that MSM normally fills out forms when 
customers are to pay of their car loan balances; 
-introducing at trial testimony from MSM's manager and Abplanalp's 
mother that was helpful to the State's case; and 
-failing to object to testimony that dealerships normally pay off balances 
on trade-in cars. 
Br. of Aplt. at 40-49. Defendant establishes neither deficient performance nor 
prejudice for his claims. 
A. Standard of Review. 
To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, defendant must 
show both that his counsel "rendered deficient performance which fell below an 
objective standard of reasonable professional judgment" and that "counsel's 
deficient performance prejudiced him." State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48? 50 (Utah 
1998) (citations omitted); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
In assessing whether trial counsel's performance fell below "an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment," Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50, this 
Court "must keep in mind 'the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel 
[and] the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal 
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defendant."5 State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990) (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689); see also Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 
(Utah), cert denied 513 P.2d 966 (1944). Because this Court "give[s] trial 
counsel wide latitude in making tactical decisions," this Court "will not question 
such decisions unless there is no reasonable basis supporting them." State v. 
Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 644 (Utah 1996) (quoting Taylor v. Warden, 905 P.2d 
277, 282 (Utah 1995)) (emphasis added). Thus, defendant must "rebut the strong 
presumption that under the circumstances, the challenged action might be 
considered sound trial strategy." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 19, 12 P.3d 
92 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
To prevail on the second prong of the test, defendant must show, to a 
demonstrable certainty, that, but for counsel's allegedly deficient performance, 
there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome at trial for 
defendant. See, e.g., Parsons, 871 P.2d at 522 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
964). His summary claims fail to rise to this level. 
B, Joinder of Charges 
Defendant first argues that his counsel rendered deficient performance by 
actively seeking joinder of the four misdemeanor charges of arranging or 
brokering motor vehicles without a license with the single felony charge of 
equity skimming. Br, of Aplt. at 41-43. He claims that the misdemeanor and 
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felony charges are "largely unrelated," and that the misdemeanor charges served 
only to stigmatize him. Id. 
Defendant raised this issue below in his Memorandum in Support of 
Application for Certificate of Probable Cause and argued the point in the hearing 
on his application (R. 234-45; R. 291:14-17). The trial court rejected the claim, 
finding that counsel may have been pursuing the reasonable trial strategy of 
presenting to the jury misdemeanor charges to which defendant admitted he had 
no defense in order to let the jury see defendant readily admit to those charges, 
thereby potentially lending him additional credibility in his denial of the felony 
charges (R. 291:17) (in Addendum D). 
Instead of showing that trial counsel could have had "no reasonable basis" 
to join the charges, defendant argues that defense counsel did not in fact have in 
mind the strategy suggested by the district court because she "did not concede or 
address [defendant's] guilt of the misdemeanor licensing violations." Br. of Aplt. 
at 42. However, the record demonstrates the contrary. 
On direct examination of her client, defense counsel established that 
defendant was a salesman for MSM in July 2002, then queried: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] What was your position there? 
[DEFENDANT:] I was a salesman for them. 
Q. Okay. 
A. They hired me to attempt to sell their automobiles for them. 
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Q. Okay. Did you have a sales license? 
A. No, Ma'am, I did not. 
Q. Had you attempted to get a sales license? 
A. I made an attempt in July. I didn't have the proper forms, and so 
I was unsuccessful. I returned in September and did get a license, yes, 
ma'am. 
Q. Okay. Were you aware of whether or not that was a requirement 
or a big deal? 
A. I didn't think it was that big of a deal. In other words, we knew 
that it needed to be done but we were not aware — I was not aware that 
it was as critical an issue as it was. 
(R. 268:209-10). With these questions, defense counsel invited defendant not 
only to admit the misdemeanor charges but to explain that it was a matter of 
ignorance instead of intent. Thus defense counsel actually adopted the very 
strategy the district court suggested as legitimate trial strategy: letting "the jury 
see him stand up there and not present a defense but only admit readily to" the 
misdemeanor charges (R. 291:17). 
Because defendant has failed to rebut the strong presumption that, under 
the circumstances, joinder of the charges might be considered sound trial 
strategy, his claim of ineffective assistance fails. See Frame, 723 P2.d at 405 
(failure to meet one prong of the test disposes of the ineffectiveness claim). 
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C. Payoff Authorization Form And Foundation for Abplanalp's 
MSM file. 
Defendant also claims that defense counsel was ineffective because she 
produced a payoff authorization form in response to Abplanalp's testimony that 
he believed he had signed one, then failed to establish foundation for admission 
of Abplanalp's MSN file to establish that no such form was in the file where it 
should have been had it been executed. Br. of Aplt. at 43-44. The result, 
defendant claims, was to reinforce Abplanalp's assertion that he had filled out a 
form when defendant's position was that no such form was completed. 
Defense counsel's strategy was clear. She wanted to discredit Abplanalp 
by having him identify the form he told the prosecutor he had filled out, then 
having him review his MSM file only to find no such form. If there were no form 
in the file, Abplanalp's credibility would suffer, as would his claim that, at the 
same meeting at which he filled out the form, defendant had told him that MSM 
would pay the balance on the Monte Carlo . 
Defendant claims that without the foundation to admit the file to prove that 
the form was not in it, defense counsel simply provided evidence to support the 
State's case against him. Br. of Aplt. at 43-44. However, defendant's argument 
presupposes that the form was not in defendant's file, yet nothing in the record 
establishes that fact. The trial court sustained the prosecutor's foundation 
objection to use of the file, and defense counsel abandoned the line of 
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questioning (R. 268:262). Consequently, the record does not reveal the contents 
of the file, and defendant's argument is pure speculation. 
Further, defense counsel was faced with a situation in which the person 
necessary to establish proper foundation for the file had already testified and 
been "released" and "excused" from the proceedings (R. 268:257). As counsel 
may reasonably have decided that, under these circumstances, it was in 
defendant's best interests to abandon the file and move to another line of 
questioning, defendant has failed to establish the requisite deficient performance. 
See Crosby, 927 P.2d at 644 (acknowledging counsel's wide latitude in making 
tactical decisions). 
Further, defense counsel's use of the form was not deficient performance 
because, as defendant recognizes, Abplanalp had already testified to having 
signed it (R. 267:62, 76). He went so far as to describe the unusual size and the 
color of the form on the first day of trial (id). 
Accordingly, counsel did not render deficient performance, and defendant's 
claim of ineffectiveness fails. 
D. Failure To Effectively Cross-Examine Abplanalp. 
Defendant contends that his counsel rendered deficient performance by 
failing to cross-examine Abplanalp concerning allegedly inconsistent testimony 
both at trial and at the preliminary hearing. Br. of Aplt. at 46. This Court should 
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strike defendant's footnote arguments and refuse to address the claim due to 
inadequate briefing. 
Defendant makes summary statements in the text of his argument 
identifying the general subject of each alleged inconsistency, but puts the 
citations and details of the allegedly inconsistent testimony in footnotes, with the 
result that defendant's brief barely fits within the fifty-page limit provided in 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(f). Br. of Aplt. at 45-46 and nn. 16-18. 
Efforts to circumvent the page limit in this manner have been frowned upon. 
See, e.g., Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City ofSpringville, 979 
P.2d 332, 334 n.l (Utah 1999); see, e.g., State v. Jiron, 866 P.2d 1249, 1249 
(Utah App. 1993) (defendant's brief was stricken for appending twenty pages of 
argument in the addendum and incorporating it into the body of the brief by 
reference in order to circumvent rule 24(a)(9)). Consequently, this Court should 
strike the footnotes and reject the remainder of defendant's argument as being 
insufficiently briefed as they lack sufficient facts with proper citations to permit 
meaningful review of the issue. See, e.g., Utah R. App. P. 24(a); State ex rel CY 
v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992) (court refusing to consider an 
argument not adequately briefed); see also State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304-
05 (Utah 1998) (inadequate briefing occurs when an argument is so lacking as to 
shift the burden of research and argument to the court and/or the state); State v. 
Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, ^  27, 989 P.2d 503 (rule 24(a)(9) requires citations 
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to relevant authority together with development of the authority and reasoned 
analysis based on that authority; without it, review is inappropriate). 
However, even on the merits, defendant's arguments fail for his inability to 
establish objectively deficient performance. See Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50 
(citations omitted). 
1. Preliminary hearing testimony. 
Defendant argues that his trial counsel failed to cross-examine Abplanalp 
with his preliminary hearing testimony that appears, on its face, to contradict his 
trial testimony. Br. of Aplt. at 44-45. At the preliminary hearing, Abplanalp 
testified that defendant told him that he [Abplanalp] would not be responsible to 
pay off the car, leading Abplanalp to assume that MSM would do it, and that the 
authorization form was not completed until after the July 19 transaction (R. 132:9-
12, 19). At trial, Abplanalp testified that defendant told him that MSM would pay 
off the Monte Carlo and that defendant had him fill out the form to authorize 
payoff by the dealership (R. 267:60, 63-64, 67: R. 268: 258, 262). 
While defendant correctly notes that his counsel did not use the preliminary 
hearing testimony, he fails to establish that counsel's inaction amounted to 
deficient performance. He simply claims that the inaction cannot be seen as 
"valid trial strategy," that it violated his constitutional right "to confront his 
accuser[,]" and that counsel "should have" asked "key questions undermining 
[Abplanalp's] credibility." Id. at 46. 
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Abplanalp's preliminary hearing testimony and his trial testimony are 
consistent. Both establish that, at some point between July 19 and July 30, 
defendant explained that the "$0" on line 11 of the contract meant that Abplanalp 
would not be responsible for the balance owed on the Monte Carlo, and defendant 
had Abplanalp complete the payoff authorization form (R. 132: 9-12; R. 267: 60, 
63-64, 67; R. 268: 258, 262). This overall consistency suggests that it would have 
been futile for defense counsel to pursue this line of cross-examination. See State 
v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, f 26, 1 P.3d 546 (failure to raise futile objections does not 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel). In view of the "wide latitude" given 
trial counsel in making tactical decisions, this Court should reject defendant's 
claim of error, because there is a reasonable basis to support defense counsel's 
inaction on this point. See id.\ Crosby, 927 P.2d at 644; State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d 
1207, 1211 (Utah App. 1991). 
2. Alleged inconsistency about when Abplanalp knew he was 
supposed to pay off the Monte Carlo. 
Defendant claims that Abplanalp gave inconsistent statements at trial 
concerning when he knew he was supposed to pay off the Monte Carlo, then 
faults his trial counsel for failing to ask Abplanalp about the inconsistency. Br. 
of Aplt. at 44-46. However, as any inconsistency was fully explained during the 
trial, defense counsel could not have performed deficiently in failing to seek yet 
another explanation. 
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Defendant notes that, at trial, Abplanalp said he "assumed" that MSM 
would pay off the $3,500 balance owing on the Monte Carlo, and that Abplanalp 
discovered his own responsibility for the debt when he took the $10,000 check 
to MSM to obtain the S-10. Id. at 45, n.16. Defendant claims this testimony was 
inconsistent with Abplanalp's later trial testimony that when he called to check 
on license plates for the S-10 a month after buying the truck, defendant told him 
that he needed to pay off the Monte Carlo. Id. 
Defendant's claim is not supported by the record. Defendant's record 
citation for the first statement does not reflect that Abplanalp said he was told of 
his own responsibility for the pay-off when he brought in the $10,000 check. 
What he said was the question of who would be paying off the Monte Carlo 
"never really came up until I brang [sic] the $10,000 check down there, and I was 
under the assumption the entire time that Mountain States would be taking care 
of it." (R. 267: 61). The prosecutor, conducting the direct examination, asked 
Abplanalp to elaborate what was said when he brought in the check (R. 267: 62). 
Abplanalp responded: 
A. After I left Mountain America I brang [sic] the check and 
handed it to Dusty Marshall. They already had the S-10 ready to go. 
They had the temporary permits on it and everything, and I gave the 




A. And I just told them that when they go get the title they 
can [sic], and I then signed a title release. 
Q. Okay, and did you tell them that you had paid the Monte 
Carlo off? 
A. No, I did not. 
(R. 267: 62). In other words, Abplanalp testified that nothing was really said 
about responsibility before he brought the check in or at the time he delivered it. 
He does not say that he was told of his responsibility when he delivered the check. 
The prosecutor then went directly to the sales contract and established that 
defendant had, in fact, represented at the time the contract was signed that MSM 
would be responsible for the Monte Carlo pay off (R. 267: 63-64). 
There is thus no discrepancy between Abplanalp's earlier testimony that he 
discovered his responsibility for paying off the Monte Carlo when he picked up 
the S-10 and his later testimony that he discovered his own responsibility for the 
pay off about a month after picking up the S-10. Defense counsel is not deficient 
for not exploiting an illusory inconsistency. Defendant's claim fails. 
3. When Abplanalp knew he had to borrow $918.35 to buy the S-
10. 
Defendant claims Abplanalp was inconsistent at trial about when he knew 
he needed to borrow an additional $918.35 to complete his purchase of the S-10 
truck. Br. of Aplt. at 45 and n.17. This is significant, he claims, because it 
directly undermined Abplanalp's credibility. Defendant points to Abplanalp's 
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knowledge when he signed the contract that he needed to borrow $10,918.35, then 
cites Abplanlalp's testimony that he did not learn of his responsibility to pay the 
$918.35 until he took the check to MSM to purchase the S-10. Id. 
In fact, although Abplanalp attempted to borrow $10,918.35 from Mountain 
America, he could only borrow $105000. He then called defendant to inform him 
that "Mountain America will only give me $10,000. No more." (R. 268: 265). 
At that point, Abplanalp does not say that "he only learned of the $918.35 after 
bringing the check for $10,000 to the dealership^]" as defendant claims. Br. of 
Aplt. at 45 n.17. He says he wasn't aware at that time that he would have "to 
finance the balance of the $900" (R. 268: 265). He then explains that he financed 
it with MSM, paying $150 a month for the next several months (R. 268: 265-66). 
Hence, it is the need to finance the amount, not the amount itself, that defendant 
discovers when he brings the check to MSM for the S-10. Again, absent the 
claimed inconsistency, counsel could not render deficient performance in failing 
to address it below. 
4. Alleged inconsistency about whether Abplanalp ever talked to 
defendant by phone. 
Defendant faults his counsel for failing to cross-examine Abplanalp about 
whether he ever talked to Marshall on the phone. Br. of Aplt. at 45 and n.18. 
Defendant's footnote implies that Abplanalp claimed never to have talked to 
defendant by phone. Id. However, Abplanalp's testimony was that he talked to 
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defendant by phone the two times Abplanalp placed the calls, but that defendant 
could not have called him as he claims because he did not have a phone (R. 268: 
264). Defendant's claim fails because defense counsel did question Abplanalp on 
this subject (R. 268: 266-67). Br. of Aplt. at 45-46, n.18. Defense counsel began 
her redirect examination of Abplanalp as follows: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Is it your testimony, then, Mr. 
Albplanalp [sic], that you could not be reached by telephone at any 
time during July? 
A. I could have at my mom's house, but I was never there. 
Q. Okay, and is it your testimony that you did not call Mr. 
Marshall at any time during this transaction? 
A. I called him to inquire about my license plates, and I called 
him to let him know that Mountain America would only give me 
$10,000. That's the only time I spoke to him over the phone. 
(R. 268: 266-67) (in Addendum D). Defense counsel not only examined 
Abplanalp on the phone issue, but clarified that Abplanalp disputed any alleged 
phone conversation with defendant except for the two he noted. Defendant's 
claim thus lacks evidentiary basis. 
E. Introduction of Odometer Evidence. 
Defendant challenges his trial counsel's questioning of MSM's secretary as 
to the company's odometer practices and of Abplanalp as to the accuracy of the 
odometer statement he signed. Br. of Aplt. at 46-47. Defendant again puts the 
record support for his claim in multiple footnotes accompanying his argument. Id. 
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at 46-47 nn. 19-22. This Court should strike the footnotes, clearly employed to 
evade rule 24fs fifty-page limit. It should further reject defendant's remaining 
claim of ineffectiveness as inadequately briefed. See subsection HID, supra, and 
cases cited herein. 
Even on the merits, defendant fails to recognize the reasonable trial 
strategy behind counsel's action. The prosecutor's questions revealed that 
someone at Mountain States had committed odometer fraud (R.). However, trial 
counsel represented defendant, not Mountain States Motors (R. 274:3). 
Accordingly, trial counsel may well have seen her duty as insulating defendant 
from the wrongdoing, even if it was at the expense of MSM's credibility (R. 
268:197). That is what defense counsel did. She objected to the odometer 
discussion as irrelevant, thus learning that the prosecutor intended to prove 
odometer fraud by MSM. She then called Michelle Mansfield, a secretary at 
MSM, to testify that what had occurred with the S-10 odometer statement occurs 
with all Mountain States vehicles (R. 268:252-53). This strategy distanced 
defendant from the odometer fraud in connection with the S-10. This was 
reasonable trial strategy. See Crosby, 927 P.2d at 644; Morgan, 813 P.2d at 
1211. 
In addition, defendant misrepresents the record when he claims that trial 
counsel had "no business leading Abplanalp to testify that the odometer statement 
he signed" for the S-10 was accurate when it had been established that it did not 
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reflect the 350 miles put on the S-10 by the manager's wife. Br. of Aplt. at 47 and 
n.22. As support, defendant cites R. 268:263-64, where the following exchange 
took place: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] I am showing you two documents... 
Q. What are they? 
A. Odometer disclosure statements. One for the S-10 and one 
for the Monte Carlo. 
Q. Do you recall signing these? 
A. I do. 
Q. What else did you sign that day? 
A. The payoff authorization form. I put my Mountain America 
Bank account on it, and the Monte Carlo, and I gave it to Mr. 
Marshall. 
Q. Okay. 
A. He requested that I sign it, and I did. 
Q. Okay. Did you look at the odometer reading on either of 
these vehicles before you signed this? 
A. I did. 
Q. Okay. Is the odometer reading on the Chevy S-10 accurate? 
A. It is. 
This exchange does not demonstrate that defense counsel was "supporting] 
the government's position" that MSM had committed odometer fraud, as 
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defendant contends. Br. of Aplt. at 48. Rather, defense counsel established that 
the victim himself had looked at the S-10 odometer before signing the document 
on July 19 and that he was convinced that the reading on the document was 
accurate, thereby supporting defendant's credibility (pi's exh. 12). Whether the 
additional mileage was put on the S-10 before Abplanalp's check of the odometer 
on July 19—and the odometer then turned back—or after his check of the 
odometer, the exchange tends to mitigate against defendant's involvement in the 
odometer fraud. 
Consequently, a reasonable trial strategy supports counsel's conduct 
regarding the odometer evidence, defeating defendant's claim of ineffectiveness. 
See Crosby, 927 P.2d at 644. 
F. Failure To Seek Jury Instructions. 
Defendant asserts that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not 
seeking jury instructions that more fully informed the jury that Abplanalp had a 
legal burden to produce the title to the Monte Carlo within forty-eight hours of 
the car's delivery to defendant (R. 268:191). Br. of Aplt. at 48. This argument 
fails to establish deficient performance. 
The fact that Abplanalp had and failed in a legal duty to produce title to the 
Monte Carlo by July 25, forty-eight hours after delivery to defendant, does not 
support defendant's ability on July 30 to sell the Monte Carlo believing that the 
title was in order (R. 268: 233). To the contrary, it may well have convinced the 
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jury of the ^^reasonableness of defendant's act of selling the car to the Fausetts 
before assuring himself that there was no title problem. Defense counsel's 
failure to raise this issue at trial amounts to reasonable trial strategy when viewed 
in this light, defeating defendant's claim. See Crosby, 927 P.2d at 644; Morgan, 
813P.2datl211. 
G. Other Instances of Alleged Ineffective Assistance, 
Defendant identifies three other instances in which trial counsel introduced 
evidence or failed to object, allegedly helping the State make its case and 
undermining defendant's case. Br. of Aplt. at 48-49. This conduct, he claims, 
establishes that "counsel could not have been acting under reasonable trial 
strategy, but instead performed in an objectively deficient manner. See, e.g., 
Moritzsky, supra." Id. at 49 (emphasis in original). This single sentence, 
together with a phrase at the end of each identified instance summarily asserting 
that counsel's conduct helped the State, constitutes the entirety of defendant's 
argument in support of a finding of deficient performance. Such summary 
argument fails entirely to meet the briefing requirements of this Court (see Utah 
R. App. P. 24(a)(9)), or defendant's burden of establishing "deficient 
performance which fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional 
judgment," Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50, or of rebutting "the strong presumption that 
under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial 
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strategy." Litherland, 2000 UT 16, f^ 19 (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
Further, the only legal authority cited by defendant for his claim, State v. 
Moritzsky, 111 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah App. 1989), does not support his assertion 
that counsel's alleged misconduct was not reasonable trial strategy. Br. of Aplt. 
at 49. Moritzsky involved a defense counsel's submission of an out-of-date jury 
instruction, an objectively deficient oversight of the law. 771 P.2d at 692. No 
such oversight exists in the claims to which defendant has applied the authority. 
Hence, defendant's final argument fails to include any relevant supporting 
authority in violation of Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9), further 
justifying rejection of his claim. See State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299 (Utah 1998) 
(absence of citation to authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority 
renders the issue inadequately briefed for purposes of appellate review). 
H. Defendant's Summary Claim of Prejudice Defeats His 
Allegations of Ineffectiveness. 
Defendant summarily contends that a "substantial likelihood of a different 
result" exists absent any or all of his counsel's allegedly deficient conduct. Br. 
of Aplt. at 49-50. The claim rests on the "weakness" of Abplanalp's testimony 
(without accounting for the non-existent inconsistencies he alleges), the "clarity" 
of the contract's requirement that Abplanalp pay off the Monte Carlo (without 
accounting for the evidence suggesting a different interpretation of the contract 
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term), and the relative values of the S-10, the check, and the Monte Carlo. Id. at 
49 (referring back to Br. of Aplt. at 30-31). Where defendant presents a 
summary claim of prejudice that takes into account only favorable evidence, the 
claim is insufficient to meet his burden. See, e.g., State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 
50 (Utah 1998) (requiring that proof that counsel's deficient performance 
prejudiced defendant must be "a demonstrable reality and not a speculative 
matter.") (quoting Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1109 (Utah 1983) 
(additional quotations omitted). Moreover, as defendant has not established 
deficient performance, his claim of cumulative prejudice is without merit. 
Consequently, his need, and his failure, to properly brief the prejudice from each 
claim of deficient performance takes on even more importance. Hence, this 
Court may reject this and all of defendant's claims of ineffective assistance on 
the prejudice prong as well. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court had jurisdiction over defendant's case, the prosecutor's 
closing remarks were appropriate statements of the trial evidence from the 
State's point of view, and defendant fails to establish any of his claims of 
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deficient performance. Consequently, the State respectfully requests that this 
Court affirm defendant's conviction. 
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76-6-522 UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
76-6-522. Definitions — Equity skimming of a vehicle —. 
Penalt ies . 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Broker" means any person who, for compensation of any kind, 
arranges for the sale, lease, sublease, or transfer of a vehicle. 
(b) "Dealer" means any person engaged in the business of selling, . 
leasing, or exchanging vehicles for compensation of any kind. 
(c) "Lease" means any grant of use or possession of a vehicle for 
consideration, with or without an option to buy. 
(d) "Security interest" means an interest in a vehicle that secures 
payment or performance of an obligation. 
(e) "Transfer" means any delivery or conveyance of a vehicle to another 
from one person to another. 
(f) "Vehicle" means every device in, upon, or by which any person or 
property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, or through 
the air or water, or over land and includes a manufactured home or mobile 
home as defined in Section 41-la-102. 
(2) A dealer or broker or any other person in collusion with a dealer or 
broker is guilty of equity skimming of a vehicle if he transfers or arranges the 
transfer of a vehicle for consideration or profit, when he knows or should have 
known the vehicle is subject to a lease or security interest, without first 
obtaining written authorization of the lessor or holder of the security interest. 
(3) Equity skimming of a vehicle is a third degree felony. 
(4) It is a defense to the crime of equity skimming of a vehicle if the accused 
proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the lease obligation or security 
interest has been satisfied within 30 days following the transfer of the vehicle. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-522, enacted by L. 
1991, ch. 291, § 1; 1992, ch. 1, § 208. 
6. Mark Thomas, #6664 
Deputy Uintah County Attorney 
152 East 100 North 
Vernal, UT 8407 8 
Telephone:(435) 781-5438 
Fax: (435) 781-5428 
JAM \ 5 2003 
J
^ M o K B £ CLERK 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
DUSTIN MARSHALL, 
DOB: 0 7 / 2 4 / 1 9 4 8 , 
D e f e n d a n t . 
B a i l 
INFORMATION 
NO. oZlSOOoilfZ 
Judge A LuKV\ f^t^jHO 
The undersigned prosecutor states on information and belief 
that the defendant, on or between July 19, 2002 and October 15, 
2002, in Uintah County, State of Utah, committed the crime of: 
EQUITY SKIMMING, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-522, a 
Third Degree Felony, as follows: That at the time and place 
aforesaid the defendant did himself or as a party, as a dealer or 
broker or any other person in collusion with a dealer or broker, 
transfer or arrange the transfer of a vehicle for consideration or 
profit, when he knows or should have known the vehicle is subject 
to a lease or security interest, without first obtaining written 
authorization of the lessor or holder of the security interest. 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the 
following witness: Wayne Hollebeke 
Authorized for presentment and filing: January 7, 
tfark Thomas 
Deputy Uintah County Attorney 
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1 offered and received. 
2 MR. THOMAS: May this witness'be excused? 
3 THE COURT: Any objection? 
4 MS. BARTON-COOMBS: No objection. 
5 THE COURT: Do you have any other witnesses? 
6 MR. THOMAS: No. 
7 THE COURT: No other witnesses. Do you have any other 
8 witnesses you intend to call? 
9 MS. BARTON-COOMBS: Let me talk to my client for a 
10 momentf your Honor. 
11 (Counsel and defendant confer off the record.) 
12 MS. BARTON-COOMBS: Your Honor, we wonrt call any 
13 witnesses 
14 at this time. 
15 THE COURT: Okay, any arguments? 
16 MR. THOMAS: I'll reserve. 
17 THE COURT: This is an unusual statute, one we don't 
18 deal with. I know you want to argue it, but just bear in mind 
19 what this says. It says, "Ifs unlawful for a person who's a 
20 party as a dealer or broker to transfer, arrange the transfer 
21 of a vehicle for a consideration or profit when he knows or 
22 should know that a vehicle is subject to a lease or security 
23 interest without first obtaining written authorization of the 
24 lessor or holder of the security interest." 
25 I guess there's two ways that I could look at this. 
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1 I could look at the transaction — two transactions that have 
2 been spoken of. One is the initial transaction and the other 
3 one is the transaction that's been spoken of, where there was 
I > 
4 an agreement to sell on a car lot. Are you relying upon one to 
5 the exclusion of the other or both of those? 
6 MR. THOMAS: Well, I think the focus is that transfer 
7 of the Monte Carlo's ownership to someone else while there was 
8 an existing lien is where our — 
9 THE COURT: That's your focus? 
10 MR. THOMAS: Yeah. 
11 THE COURT: I just wanted to make sure that's where we 
12 were. Okay, you may address the issue. 
13 MS. BARTON-COOMBS: Thank you, your Honor. Your Honor, 
14 I would submit that the State has failed to meet their burden 
15 on this case. There has been second-hand information saying 
16 that Mr. Marshall had asked for release on the title because he 
17 was trying to sell it. 
18 There has been no other indication that there actually 
19 was a sale. There's been no purported buyer, no indication 
20 that this car was sold. Only that Mr. Marshall had asked 
21 Mountain States for the release of the title. 
22 Under the statute I think the transfer — or at least 
23 some further indication of the arrangement of the transfer 
24 needs to be done. The only thing that's been shown is that 
25 Mr. Marshall attempted to have the title released. Under that, 
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1 your Honor, we would submit that the State has failed to meet 
2 its burden. 
3 THE COURT: Well, the testimony is that he showed up at 
4 the bank and tried to arrange to have the vehicle transferred 
5 because he said he had a buyer. 
6 MR. THOMAS: Actually he said he sold it, and that 
7 is the same thing that he told Chade Abplanalp. By his own 
8 admission he sold it. 
9 THE COURT: I think that there's enough here to bind it 
10 over. I'm glad I asked for the explanation. You're focusing 
11 on the sale of the Monte Carlo. I think when he showed up, 
12 there's evidence before the Court sufficient for bind over. 
13 When he showed up at the bank at least that that was 
14 an arrangement to transfer the vehicle, and that at that time, 
15 and that he was doing that as part of the sale, which is a 
16 consideration. 
17 There's evidence from Ms. Shelly and Mr. Abplanalp 
18 that indicated that he was aware of the lease at the time 
19 of the sale of the S-10, and he had not obtained written 
20 authorization of the security interest at that time. 
21 This matter is to be bound over. This matter will be 
22 bound over. Can I get back to you, just because I have it here 
23 and you may have your copy. I didn't mark on it. 
24 MS. BARTON-COOMBS: Sure. 





















































I think we can set it for trial, 
no reason to talk about it? 
My previous feeling is that there's 
spend actually quite a bit of time 
preparation of a 
that this is a matter 
rt. 
THE 











preliminary hearing, and I 
that really needs to be just heard 
Just heard, just 
-COOMBS: 
have a jury hear it, be 
Yes, your Honor. 
How long will it 
-COOMBS: At least 
I would say at '. 





















think we i 




the month of May. So I < 
take to try this? 
a day. . 
Least we will tack on some 
heard at the same time. 
leed a day and a half? 
a day and a half would be a 
Honor, for the Court's 
, because I know what 
Benson vacated our trial 
am now free for the month 
Addendum B 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 
Proof of the commission of the crime of Equity Skimming, requires 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each of the following elements 
of that crime: 
1. That Dustin Marshall; 
2. On or about July 19, 2002 
3. Did as a dealer or broker; 
4. Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly; 
a. Transferred or arranged the transfer of a vehicle for 
consideration or profit; 
5. When he knew or should have known the vehicle was subject 
to a security interest; 
6. Without first obtaining written authorization of the holder 
of the security interest. 
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1 objection was made at that time, and it is incumbent upon — 
2 that's the purpose of having a Court to be here, and my 
3 capacity is to rule upon those things, and so that somebody 
4 isn't given the opportunity to just let an objection go by, and 
5 then raise it later on, and get a new trial if they don't like 
6 the result of the trial. 
7 > The obligation is to raise the objection. No 
8 objection was made. Other than plain error I don't think that 
9 there's any document that would allow the Court to interfere 
10 with the verdict of the jury, and then the plain error must 
11 have interfered with the substantial rights of the party's 
12 constitutional right. 
13 With respect to the other issue, that's the jury 
14 instruction. That was something that I think, certainly that 
15 they were going to do this again, we would put another date in 
16 there or we would put from July 19th to July 30tK. 
17 July 19th was the date that Mr. Abplanalp initially 
18 entered into an agreement with Mountain State's Motors, and the 
19 30th was the date where the vehicle that had been traded in was 
20 the subject of a sales agreement with another individual by the 
21 name of Faucet, as I recall. 
22 My obligation here is to see if that date there 
23 created a problem such that the Court should grant the motions 
24 which are before the Court. 
25 I will note again that this was something that was 
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1 dealt with in chambers, and that the instructions were reviewed 
2 by both parties, and both parties had a part in dealing with 
3 the instructions, and neither made an objection to that. In 
4 fact, they firmly represented to the Court that the jury 
5 instructions were acceptable. 
6 Against that back drop I need to take a look at the 
7 rules. Rule 50 is the Rule of Civil Procedure. No one 
8 referred me to the rules, but Rule 50 is for judgment not 
9 withstanding the verdict. That's not available in this case 
10 because the procedure to bring the issue before the Court as a 
11 motion for verdict not withstanding the judgment of a jury 
12 requires that the moving party had first made a motion for 
13 directed verdict, and the failure to make such a motion for a 
14 directed verdict forecloses the trial court from considering a 
15 motion for judgment not withstanding the verdict under Rule 50 
16 of the Utah Rules Civil Procedure. 
17 Under the Rule 59 of Civil Procedure, which is a 
18 motion for a new trial, that rule is specifically subject to 
19 Rule 61 which is the harmless rule — Harmless Error Rule, and 
20 requires the moving party, in order to establish the necessity 
21 for a new trial to establish, the justice requires a new trial 
22 and error must substantially affect the rights of the parties. 
23 One of the reasons the Court could grant a motion for 
24 a new trial under Rule 59 is any irregularity in the 
25 proceedings of the court the jury or the adverse party by which 
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1 a party was prevented from having a fair trial. That specific 
2 provision requires an affidavit, and none has been provided to 
3 this Court. Another is in subsection (7), an error in law. 
4 I also looked at the rule of criminal procedure, and 
5 Rule 23 allows for a rest of judgement, and requires the Court 
6 to arrest the judgement for a good cause. The standard, 
7 however, is that the Court must look at the evidence in the 
8 light most favorable to the verdict, and determine that 
9 reasonable minds must have obtained a reasonable vow, and to 
10 the extent that this is viewed as an evidentiary issue, I think 
11 that there are certainly — there was evidence presented to the 
12 jury upon which the jury could find the defendant guilty of the 
13 charge of equity skimming. 
14 The statute defines — somewhere — excuse me, there 
15 are two files here and I took a look at the jury instructions. 
16 I guess the jury instructions are in one file and not the 
17 other. 
18 The statute, first of all, requires that a person 
19 intentionally knowing to recklessly transfer or arrange to 
20 transfer. So part of the argument that you've made Ms. Barton-
21 Coombs that there was never a transfer just isn't sufficient to 
22 cause the Court to believe that the evidence wouldn't support a 
23 verdict because there was definitely evidence before the Court 
24 that Mr. Marshall arranged for the transfer of a vehicle, and 
25 that he did so with respect to, in fact, both of the 
-15-
1 transactions. 
2 But I think that it's clear to me that the evidence 
3 was presented and the argument was made with respect to the 
4 violation of the law occurring on the transfer on July the 30th 
5 to Mr. and Ms. Faucet. 
6 This statute also defines who a dealer or broker is, 
7 or who a sales person is, and under the statute a dealer or 
8 broker is, "any person who will act and for compensation of any 
9 kind arranges for the sale, lease or transfer of the vehicle." 
10 The evidence was sufficient to show that Mr. Marshall 
11 was acting — he was expecting to be compensated on both of 
12 these arrangements. He was listed as a sales person, and the 
13 evidence is that he arranged for the sale of this Monte Carlo, 
14 certainly to Mr. and Ms. Faucet. 
15 On thexevidence there's no question in my mind that 
16 there is not sufficient — the evidence is not so infirm or 
17 lacking in any way that the Court could find that the jury — a 
18 reasonable jury must have necessarily found reasonable doubt. 
19 Rule 50 — Rule 24 is the Rule's criminal procedure 
20 for a new trial, and it requires or allows the new trial where 
21 there's an error of impropriety which had a substantial adverse 
22 effect in the rights of a party. 
23 The motions required to be accompanied by an 
24 affidavit, which didn't occur in this case. And the standard 
25 is that no reasonable — if there was a reasonable likelihood 
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1 that the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way that 
2 violates the Utah or Federal Constitution. 
3 With respect to that issue, the Court will note that 
4 the day of the attempts is not, theoretically, an element of 
5 the crime. In order to find the defendant guilty of the crime 
6 it is not necessary that the State prove beyond a reasonable 
7 doubt the day the event occurred. 
8 There are some issues involving the day of the event. 
9 They have to do with putting the defendant on notice as to when 
10 he was alleged to have violated the law, and also some 
11 jurisdictional issues that the statute had not. 
12 But in this case, as I've indicated, from the time of 
13 preliminary hearing right through trial the evidence, the 
14 argument, and the focus of the jury of the parties — not the 
15 jury, but the focus of the counsel was on the transaction with 
16 Mr. Faucet, and as I've indicated it, my obligation is to see 
17 if there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury was confused. 
18 It's interesting that, with respect to that, that in 
19 her argument, Ms. Barton-Coombs argument, she says that, "There 
20 was no way that the jury could have found him guilty of the 
21 offense as occurring on July 19th," and I believe that's 
22 correct. Now, I don't think that anybody ever alleged that the 
23 transaction on July 19th, which was actually a transaction that 
24 was completed, I think, on the 23rd of July that there was never 
25 any allegation that the law was violated at that time, and yet 
-17-
1 as I keep coming back we have the jury instructions which refer 
2 to that date. 
3 But the fact that there's no logical way, and I think 
4 I'm almost quoting Ms. Barton-Coombs, that the jury could have 
5 found equity skimming on that date, and the way the trial 
6 progressed leads me to believe that they could have only found 
7 the offenses that had related to Mr. Faucet, and so I believe 
8 that there isn't any substantial issue under Rule 24 in 
9 addition to the fact that the Rule hasn't been completely 
10 complied with, which would cause me to believe that there was a 
11 reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the — challenge 
12 the jury instruction in a way that violated his Utah or Federal 
13 Constitutional Rights. 
14 I am strongly influenced in making that decision by 
15 the fact that no one ever said, during the whole trial, no one 
16 even intimated that that initial transaction was in violation 
17 of the law. That is, although there were two versions of what 
18 happened, until the vehicle was transferred to another party no 
19 one alleged that the law had been violated. 
20 So based upon all of that I think I've looked at all 
21 of the applicable rules. I find that the jury made it's 
22 decision, and I don't think that there's anything before the 
23 Court that undermines the jury decision. Based upon that the 
24 motions will be denied. 
25 We can then — is there any legal reason why 
Addendum C 
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1 Then the Monte Carlo goes back through Dustin Marshall. He 
2 completes the transaction. He's doing the paperwork. He knew 
3 there was money owed on this. Chade told him. 
4 He testified that he knew there was money owed on 
5 that. He did absolutely nothing to identify whether or not the 
6 title had come back clear. He did absolutely nothing to verify 
7 that in fact the information that he knew was cleared up. He 
8 testified he knew there was money owed on the car, and then he 
9 said he didn't verify whether or not the title was clean. 
10 Okay. Why is that important? Because the element in 
11 that particular charge is not that he knew, that he knew or 
12 should have known the vehicle was subject to a security. So 
13 you have to ask yourself, should he have known the vehicle was 
14 subject to a security? He was told. He admitted he knew. 
15 You can look at the evidence — some of the other 
16 evidence that is there. There is some direct evidence here. 
17 During negotiations the direct evidence was that Chade told 
18 the defendant that he owed between $3,400 and $3,600. Chade 
19 was told by the defendant that the zero on line 11 meant that 
20 Mountain States would pay off the Monte Carlo. That's what 
21 Chade believed. 
22 Let me just add here something that I don't have on 
23 this particular diagram relating to Shelly Sorenson's comments. 
24 When questioned about the contract, the sales contract which is 
25 your State's Exhibit No. 3, do you remember what she said about 
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1 the trade in? She said, "We don't pay any attention to that 
2 part of the contract, because different car dealers do it 
3 differently and they negotiate it differently." 
4 So even though the defendant's going to come up here 
5 through his attorney and argue, "This is what the contract 
6 said, that Chade owed that," that Chade owed that. There was 
7 a zero here, you know. It didn't matter to the banker. As a 
8 matter of fact, the banker said, "You're allowed $10,000 and we 
9 assumed that's all it was." As a matter of fact, the person 
10 who secured the loan, Shelly Sorenson, said, "I assumed that 
11 Mountain States would be paying off the car." 
12 
13 So you have to put all that into perspective. So 
14 he also testified that — Chade also testified, which was 
15 important — that he didn't give the title of the Monte Carlo 
16 to the defendant, and the defendant didn't receive the title. 
17 So when the defendant received the Monte Carlo, he didn't get 
18 the title. He knew or should have known the title wasn't 
19 clear. 
20 Interesting development, the Fausetts traded in the 
21 vehicle. They testified the defendants knew exactly what to 
22 do with collecting the title of the vehicle they traded in. 
23 Now, he didn't do anything here. Should he have known? He 
24 was told, he admitted he knew there was an amount owing. 
25 Shelly Sorenson. Her first conversation with the 
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1 defendant was after he sold the vehicle. Never before he 
2 sold the vehicle did the defendant call and say, "You know 
3 what, have we got that title back from the Monte Carlo? Is 
4 it clear?" Never did he do that. Should he have known there 
5 was a problem with it? Of course. He was told. He admitted 
6 he knew, but he did nothing to verify if it was clear until 
7 after he sold the vehicle. Ms. Sorenson was clear on that. 
8 During the conversation he requested it be released. 
9 He told Mrs. Sorenson that Chade should have financed through 
10 Mountain States Motors. He should have financed through 
11 Mountain States Motors. Then he also said Ms. Sorenson said 
12 the defendant said that she had been told that he knew there 
13 was a lien, and the defendant admitted he knew there was a 
14 lien. 
15 The defendant's testimony is the timing was a little 
16 bit different. That he didn't really know there was a lien 
17 until afterward, but the fact of the matter is that contradicts 
18 his own statements that he knew there was a lien on it to begin 
19 with, but he made no effort to verify whether or not it was 
20 free and clear before he was involved with the transaction and 
21 passed that exact Monte Carlo to the Fausetts. 
22 Pat Albplanalp, she testified also she talked to the 
23 defendant. He acknowledged there was a lien on the vehicle. 
24 There are some inferences and circumstances you can take into 
25 account there. The defendant knew that there was not a clear 
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1 title to the Monte Carlo, because he had been told. 
2 Okay, and that's really uncontroverted. He said, 
3 "I knew it wasn't clear." He told me. Defendant could not 
4 reasonably believe that he could sell the Monte Carlo without 
5 a clear title. That's an inference he can draw. Surely he 
6 should have known. 
7 Also, the defendant knew there was a lien on the Monte 
8 Carlo when he sold it to the Fausetts, because of all of these 
9 other inferences. Another inference that you might consider is 
10 when he said, "It would be better if you can finance through 
11 Mountain States." If he finances the whole thing through 
12 Mountain States you can almost infer that the defendant might 
13 have been attempting to hide the transaction of exactly what 
14 was going on, if it had been totally financed through Mountain 
15 States. 
16 Now, those are potential inferences, but the reality 
17 is did he know or should have known? That's the real issue, 
18 and he admitted that he knew there was a lien on the — there 
19 was a lien on that particular car to begin with, and he did 
20 absolutely nothing before he was involved in the transaction to 
21 pass it through somebody else to verify if the lien was clear. 
22 THE COURT: Ms. Barton-Coombs. 
23 MS. BARTON-COOMBS: I promised you yesterday when we 
24 started this that you were going to see an elephant. Do you 
25 see the elephant? You've been to town and you've seen the 
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1 document. Not only did he know that document, he specifically 
2 knew what went into that document, and that was details on how 
3 to pay off the Monte Carlo. 
4 Let me tell you some other reasons I think you need to 
5 believe Chade's story about this. Shelly Sorenson, she deals 
6 with these contracts. She testified quite a bit. You know how 
7 much attention she paid to line 11 and the payoff amount on 
8 this contract of sale, Exhibit No. 3. Remember what she said? 
9 Zero. 
10 It didn't matter, because the dealership makes other 
11 representations. Mr. Sprouse testified that they were going 
12 to give him a $5,000 trade in on a car that was only worth 
13 $3,300 to him. He said, "Well, that's just how you make the 
14 deal." 
15 In other words, he's willing to represent something 
16 completely different than what's reality to make the deal, and 
17 that's why Shelly Sorenson says, "We don't pay any attention to 
18 that line," because the defendant represented that he was — 
19 that Mountain States was going to pay off the loan to Mountain 
20 America Credit Union. 
21 Also, the defendant testified he knew that there 
22 was an amount due on the Monte Carlo, but neither of the 
23 Sprouses testified that the defendant told them that during 
24 the negotiations. The only thing the defendant told the 
25 Sprouses during the negotiations was the sales price, the 
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1 trade in price, and those types of things. 
2 They never — as a matter of fact, Mr. Sprouse, the 
3 younger Mr. Sprouse testified when he got on the phone with 
4 Ms. Albplanalp he said, "I don't even know what you're talking 
5 about. You'll have to talk to him. He had no idea. 
6 Now, let me focus this down a little bit more. Did he 
7 know or should have known. Remember, it's not just know, but 
8 should have known. Should he have known? He testified that he 
9 knew there was an amount owed on the Monte Carlo. He sold the 
10 car without verifying — sold the Monte Carlo to the Fausetts 
11 without verifying. 
12 What does the statute require? Two elements; the last 
13 element says "without first getting written authorization." 
14 What did Mr. Marshall have to do before he could cut loose that 
15 Monte Carlo? Get written authorization from the lien holder. 
16 He testified, "I never even checked with Mountain America." 
17 Did he have written authorization? No. 
18 Ms. Sorenson testified that the first time that she 
19 was contacted at the bank was when he called and said, "I sold 
20 the vehicle. There is no evidence whatsoever that Mr. Marshall 
21 got written authorization from the lien holder, which he 
22 admitted he knew there was an issue to Mountain America. 
23 Let me just say one other thing. As you consider 
24 which testimony you believe and which of Chade or Mr. Marshall, 
25 you know, Mr. Marshall sat up here on the witness stand and 
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testified, "You know,, I just trusted him that he would get the 
title. I had his word. I had his word that he would pay off 
a $3,300 to $3,600 to Mountain America and just give me the 
title. I had his word." 
So why didn't he rely on his word for the $918.35? 
He entered a contract that had to be cosigned for $918.35, 
but he'll take his word that he's going to pay off the title 
for $3,300 to $3,600. The reality of the fact is-and what is 
really happening is what Mountain States agreed to was not 
what Mr. Marshall agreed to. 
Mr. Marshall represented to Mr. Albplanalp that he 
was going to pay off Mountain America. That didn't happen, but 
in the interim, the crime here is when Mr. Marshall involved 
himself as a dealer or broker in transferring that vehicle to 
the Fausetts, knowing or should have known that the vehicle had 
a lien on it, and did not first get written authorization to 
sell the vehicle. 
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the defendant is 
guilty of all counts. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Thomas. 
(Closing arguments concluded.) 
Addendum D 
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part of defense Counsel because — for two reasons. 
While you argue that that may have hurt his credibility, 
defense Counsel — trial Counsel may have thought it might have 
enhanced his credibility because he stood before the jury and 
readily admitted those charges, and I think there may have been 
trial -- may well have been trial strategy to place those issues 
which you indicate that there was no defense to before the jury 
and allow him the opportunity of having the jury see him stand up 
there and not present a defense but only admit readily to that. 
Because there was no — there really wasn't contested 
facts. I think that if anything it benefitted him. I can't see 
any indication either in this case that there is a substantial 
likelihood that -- of reversal based upon that issue. 
Furthermore, I don't think that it's the kind of issue 
that I could say that but for that the jury would have found it 
would have been a different outcome because it just — it was 
almost a side issue, and I really believe, if anything, if I were 
making the call that he got some benefit from the jury through 
the jury seeing him stand up and say, "Yeah, I made a mistake 
here and I'm admitting it. I don't contest that, but this is not 
true." So I think may have well have been a trial strategy. 
Those are the two issues you've presented to me? 
MR. BUGDEN: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: I will deny your motion on that issue, but I 
am concerned about an issue that you haven't raised, and I 
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1 A. I believe I was to pay like $150 a month for seven 
2 months or so. 
3 Q. Okay, and that was through Mountain States Motors? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. But did he ask you about whether or not you'd paid off 
6 the Monte Carlo? 
7 A. No. 
8 Q. But that was the same time that you discussed that 
9 provision of the contract or was that after? 
10 A. It was the same^ time, I believe. 
11 Q. Okay, and it was your impression, then, that you did 
12 not have to pay the Monte Carlo off; that Mountain States 
13 would? 
14 A. Because I even signed the release form. 
15 Q. Okay, and the release form that you signed contains 
16 specific information concerning the account at Mountain America 
17 Credit Union? 
18 A. (Nonverbal response.) 
19 THE COURT: You need to answer out loud. 
20 Q. BY MR. THOMAS: Would you answer out loud? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 MR. THOMAS: Okay, great. Thank you. 
23 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
24 BY MS. BARTON-COOMBS: 
25 Q. Is it your testimony, then, Mr. Albplanalp, that you 
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1 could not be reached by telephone at any time during July? 
2 A. I could have at my mom's house, but I was never there. 
3 Q. Okay, and is it your testimony that you did not call 
4 Mr. Marshall at any time during this transaction? 
5 A. I called him to inquire about my license plates, and 
6 I called him to let him know that Mountain America would only 
7 give me $10,000. That's the only time I spoke to him over the 
8 phone. 
9 Q. Okay. . Did you have a cosigner for the $900? 
10 A. I did. 
11 Q. And did he — that gentleman go with you at any time 
12 to Mountain States Motors? 
13 A. He was there every time I went to Mountain States 
14 Motors. 
15 Q. Okay. A few moments ago when you were talking with 
16 Mr. Thomas, when you were talking about the zero balance on 
17 the contract, you said the zero there — and I thought you 
18 said, "I'm not responsible." Are you talking about you're not 
19 responsible or Mr. Marshall said he wasn't responsible? 
20 A. I'm saying that I'm not responsible. 
21 Q. Okay. 
22 A. Because I signed a contract with zero. 
23 Q. Okay. 
24 A. Meaning that I don't have to pay it. That's what I 
25 was under the representation of. 
